The Human Rights Committee and Articles 7 and 10(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966 by Ghandhi, P R
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 13 Issue 2 Article 10 
10-1-1990 
The Human Rights Committee and Articles 7 and 10(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
P R. Ghandhi 
University of Reading 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
P R. Ghandhi, "The Human Rights Committee and Articles 7 and 10(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966" (1990) 13:2 Dal LJ 758. 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
P. R. Ghandhi* The Human Rights Committee
and Articles 7 and 10(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1966
I. Introduction
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocol thereto, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in Resolution 2200A (XXI) t of 16 December 1966,
entered into force on 23 March 1976 in accordance with Articles 49 of
the Covenant and 9 of the Protocol respectively. As at 28 July 1989,
there were eighty-seven States Parties to the Covenant and forty-five
States Parties to the Protocol.
The Covenant established the Human Rights Committee, which
consists of eighteen individuals serving in their personal capacity, as the
central international organ of its implementation. 2 This body controls
each of the three separate measures of implementation introduced by the
Covenant.3 In each of these procedures the Committee plays the
dominant role.
*P.R. Ghandi, M.A. (Oxon.); LL.M. (London) University of Reading.
1. U.N. Doc. A/6316.
2. Article 28.
3. On the measures of implementation contained in the Covenant, see generally; A.H.
Robertson, The Implementation System: International Measures, in: L. Henkin (ed.), the
International Bill of Rights - The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 1981);
R.S. Pathak, "The Protection of Human Rights" (1978), 18 Indian J. Int. Law 266; J.G.
Merrills, (ed.), A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World (Manchester, 1989); F Capotorti,
The International Measures of Implementation included in the covenants on Human Rights, in:
A. Eide/A. Schou (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium on the International
Protection of Human Rights (Stockholm, 1967); A.G. Mower, "Organising to Implement the
UN Civil/Political Rights Covenant; First Steps by the Committee" (1978), 3, Human Rights
Review, 122; id, Implementing United Nations Covenants, in: A.A. Said (ed.), Human Rights
and World Order, New Jersey 1978; id, "The Implementation of the U.N. Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights" (1977), 10 Human Rights Journal 271; B.G. Ramcharan, Implementing
the International Covenants on Human Rights, in: B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), Human Rights
Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration (The Hague, 1979); Institutions et procedures
issues des conventions relatives aux droits de 'homme .. , in: K. Vasak (ed.), Les Dimensions
Internationales des Droits de I'Homme, UNESCO Manual (Paris, 1978); E. Schwelb, "The
United Kingdom signs the Covenants on Human Rights" (1969), 18 I.C.L.Q. 457; id, "Civil
and Political Rights: the International Measures of Implementation" (1968), 62 Am. J. Int.
Law 827; id, "The International measures of Implementation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and of the Optional Protocol" (1977), 12 Texas International L.J.
141; D.L. Shelton, The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in: H. Hannum (ed.), Guide to International Human Rights Practice (London, 1984);
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First, the Committee's duty is to study reports submitted by the States
Parties, in accordance with Article 40(1), and to transmit its reports, and
such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States
Parties.4 It may also transmit these general comments to the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations, together with the copies of the
reports it has received from the States Parties. 5 This is the only activity of
the Committee to which States are automatically subject on becoming
parties to the Covenant. Secondly, the Committee is competent to
consider communications from a State Party which considers that
another State Party is not giving effort to the provisions of the Covenant.
In such a case, it must make available its good offices to the States Parties
concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter. This function
can be exercised by the Committee only if both States concerned have
declared that they recognize its competence to receive and consider such
communications from States Parties. Furthermore, this procedure only
became applicable when ten States Parties accepted the competence of
the Committee. As at 28 July 1989, twenty-four such declarations of
acceptance had been lodged with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. Other functions with respect to inter-state proceedings are
performed by an ad hoc conciliation commission. The optional inter-state
communication procedure in its entirety is regulated in detail by Articles
41 and 42 of the Covenant. 6 Thirdly, with respect to States Parties to the
Optional Protocol, the Committee is competent to receive and consider
M. Lippnan, "Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human Rights under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1980), 10 California Western
International Law Journal, 450; R. Starr, "International Protection of Human Rights and the
United Nations Convenants" (1967), Wisconsin L.Rev., 863-890; see also: "U.N. Rights
Covenants become Law: So What? (1976), 70; Proceedings of the Am J. Int. Law 97.
4. "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures
they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made
in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present
Covenant for the States Parties concerned; (b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so
requests."
5. Article 40(4). See in particular, on the operation of the reporting system: D.D. Fischer,
"Reporting under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: the First Five Years of the
Human Rights Committee" (1982), 76 American J. of International Law, 142-153; E
Jhabvala, "The Practice of the Covenant's Human Rights Committee, 1976-82: Review of the
State Party Reports" (1984), 6 Human Rights Quarterly 81; J.L. Gomez del Prado, "United
Nations Conventions on Human Rights: The Practice of the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Dealing with Reporting
Obligations of States Parties" (1985), 7 Human Rights Quarterly 492; see also: the Annual
Reports of the Human Rights Committee since 1977 for lists of reports by State Parties and
their contents.
6. See in particular: S. Leckie, "The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human
Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking" (1988), 10 Human Rights Quarterly
249.
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communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a violation
by a State which is a party both to the Covenant and to the Optional
Protocol of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. The function of the




The Human Rights Committee has had ample opportunity to examine,
interpret, and pronounce upon the provisions of article 7 of the
Covenant, very often in conjunction with article 10(1), in its
jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol. It has also issued general
comments on both these provisions. Article 7 prohibits, in the first place,
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and
article 10(1) provides that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person. Very many cases, especially but not exclusively, the early
spate of communications against Uruguay and other South American
countries, have raised issues under these two provisions.
The jurisprudence reveals a somewhat cautious approach to
interpretation which, however, might well be justified in the
circumstances of the trans-continental application of Covenant. A
7. Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol. On the Jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee see generally: P.R. Ghandi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of
Individual Communication (1986), 57 British Yearbook of International Law 201; A. de
Zayas/Th. Moller/T. Opsahl, "Application of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights Committee" (1985), 28
German Yearbook of International Law 9; id, "Application of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights Committee"
(1989), 26 Comparative Juridicial Rev., 3; A.F Bayefsky, "The Human Rights Committee and
the case of Sandra Lovelace" (1982), 20 Canadian Year Book of International Law 244; V.
Dimitrijevic, Activity of the Human Rights Committee" (1983), 34 Rev. of International
Affairs 24; B.G. Ramcharan, "The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee"
(1980), 6 Dalhousie L.J. 7; C. Jones, "Human Rights: Rights of Relatives of Victims - Views
of the Human Rights Committee in the Quinteros Communication" (1984), 25 Harvard
International L.J., 470; M. Nowak, "The Effectiveness of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights - Stocktaking after the first Eleven Sessions of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee" (1980), 1 Human Rights L.J. 136; C. Tomuschat, Evolving Procedural Rules: The
U.N. Human Rights Committee's First Two Years of Dealing with Individual Communica-
tions, ibid, 249; M. Nowak, "UN Human Rights Committee: Survey of Decisions given up till
July 1981" (1981), 2 Human Rights L.J. 168; id, "UN Human Rights Committee: Survey of
Decisions given up till October 1982" (1982), 3 Human Rights L.J., 207; id, "UN Human
Rights Committee: Survey of Decisions given up till July 1984" (1984), 5 Human Rights L.
J., 199; id, "UN Human Rights Committee: Survey of Decisions given up till July 1986"
(1986), 7 Human Rights L.J., 287; B. Graefrath, "Trends Emerging in the Practice of the
Human Rights Committee" (1980), 3 Bulletin of the GDR Committee for Human Rights 3.
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number of interesting features emerge from a study of this case-law. A
remarkable point is that, although the Committee delivered decisions on
whether or not there had been breaches of articles 7 and 10(1) from
1979, when it forwarded its first views under article 5(4)8 of the Optional
Protocol, it was not until 1982 that it availed itself on the opportunity to
interpret these rights by way of "general comments" under article 40(4)
of the Covenant. In effect, therefore, for three years or so it was declaring
certain forms of treatment to be self evidently in breach of the articles
concerned, since there is very little by way of interpretation of the
proscriptions in the cases themselves, especially in early cases. This is, in
itself, surprising since the Committee has always appeared to be much
less reticent in its jurisprudence particularly on the procedural provisions
of the Optional Protocol and on other 'key' substantive provisions, such
as article 4, encapsulating the right to derogate. 9
It is also interesting to observe - and this appears to be a more general
phenomenon - that the Committee is reluctant to make reference to the
jurisprudence of other regional institutions established for the protection
of human rights, such as the European Convention on Human Rights,
1950, and the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969.10 In one
sense, this is perfectly understandable. The Committee is a singular body
entrusted with supervision of an international treaty in which many
diverse systems of law and politics are represented in contradistinction,
for example, to the European Convention, the States Parties to which are
relatively homogeneous in terms of political systems and ideology.
Accordingly, it may be that interpretations given to a term under the
European Convention will not necessarily be apposite to an interpreta-
tion of the same or similar term under the Covenant; or it may be
impossible to clothe the particular provision in an international treaty
with the same amount of detail in interpretation as it would be possible
to do in a more 'specific' regional context. Also, it is no doubt true that
the Committee wishes to stamp its own particular character on the
emerging case-law. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a very rich vein
of interpretative data emanating, for example, from the European
Convention, which is relatively untapped.
Occasionally, there is a suspicion of inconsistency - facts which are
remarkably similar have produced indifferent pronouncements - and
sometimes some rather thought-provoking issues have been shelved, or,
8. "The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual."
9. See P.R. Ghandhi, "The Human Rights Committee and Derogation in Public Emergencies"
(1989) 32, German Yearbook of International Law, 323.
10. See J.G. Merrills, (ed.), A.H. Robertson, op.cit supra, footnote 3, at p.68.
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it has not been found necessary to deal with the issue because of a
determination of inadmissibility." In general, therefore, for a variety of
reasons including, of course, the fact that the Committee is a comparative
newcomer to the international stage when compared with the European
institutions at Strasbourg, the case-law of the Committee seems less dense
and developed.
III. Analysis
From an analytical point of view it seems appropriate to divide the
jurisprudence into two segments: the first being the period 1979-1982
before the "general comment" on articles 7 and 10(1), and the second
being the period after 1982 including the general comments themselves.
(i) The first period
The very first case in which the Committee gave final views and which
articles 7 and 10(1) were considered was Massera v. Uruguay.'2 Several
conclusions may be drawn from this case. First, detention "under
conditions seriously detrimental to ... health" will be a breach of article
10(1) and 7, though in respect of the latter article it is uncertain whether
this is on the basis that such treatment is "inhuman" or "degrading"; it
seems probable that it is inhuman since in Buffo Carballal v. Uruguay,13
the Committee referred to broadly similar conditions as "harsh".
Secondly, article 10(1) will cover situations where a detainee has been
held incommunicado for some months and cases where he is denied the
right to be visited by any family member or the possibility of
communicating with counsel of his own choosing. This is amply
illustrated in the subsequent case-law.' 4 Thirdly, with respect to one of
the alleged victims, viz. Jos6 Luis Massera, the Committee held that there
had been a breach of article 7 and article 10(1) "because during his
detention he was tortured as a result of which he suffered permanent
physical damage"; this finding does not make it clear whether torture
11. On the jurisprudence on admissibility, see P.R. Ghandhi, op.ciL supra, footnote 7,
201-251.
12. Comm.no.Rl/5, GAOR, 34th Session, Supplement No.40(A/34/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 124.
13. Comm.no.R8/33, GAOR, 36th Session, Supplement No.40(A/36/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 125.
14. See Drescher Caldas v. Uruguay, comm.no. 43/1979, GAOR, 38th session, Supplement
No.40(A/38/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.192; Martinez Machado v.
Uruguay, comm.no.83/1981, GAOR, 39th Session, Supplement No. 40(A/39/40), Report of
the Human Rights Committee, p.148; Gilboa v. Uruguay, comm.no.147/1983, GAOR, 41st
session, Supplement No. 40(A/41/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 128.
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necessitates "permanent physical damage" or whether "permanent
physical damage" justifies an additional finding under article 10(1).
Although the finding makes abundantly clear that there is a close
relationship between the two articles, it is not very precise and the way
it is expressed in this decision seems to imply that a breach of article 7
automatically involves a breach of article 10(1), because the latter article
stands at the bottom of a sliding scale of graduated proscriptions covered
by both articles in conjunction. Such an interpretation receives support
from the wording of the Committee's decision on articles 7 and 10(1) in
Grille Motta v. Uruguay. I5
Fourthly, the only specific allegation of torture made and found was
that in respect of Jos6 Luis Massera and related only to 'head-hooding';
however, it seems appropriate to conclude that other techniques which
are involved in relation to another victim in this case - 'planton' (wall-
standing), electric shocks (particularly in the genital region) and
'bastinado' (blows) - would necessarily be considered as torture. This
conclusion is borne out by later cases where these and other
complementary techniques, such as 'submarino seco', 'caballete', 'picano',
'stringing-up', asphyxiation, denial of anything to eat or drink, were
explicitly found to be torture.16 Finally it should be noted that the
interesting issue of the "psychological" torture pleaded by the author
herself did not have to be considered because her claim was inadmissible
ratione temporis. 17
15. Comm.no.R2/l 1, GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No.40(A/35/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 132.
16. See for example Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, comm.no.R12/52, GAOR, 36th Session,
Supplement No.40(A/36/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 1 76; Sendic v.
Uruguay, comm.no.R14/63, GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of
the Human Rights Committee, p.114; Bleier v. Uruguay, comm.no.R7/30, GAOR, 37th
Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.130;
Quinteros v. Uruguay, comm.no. 107/1981, GAOR, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/38/
40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 2 16; for a case not involving Uruguay but
where a finding of torture was made, see Muteba v. Zaire, comm.no.124/1982, GAOR 39th
Session, Supplement No.40(A/39/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.182; see
also Gilboa v. Uruguay, comm.no.147/1983, GAOR, 41st Session, Supplement No.40(A/41/
40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.128; Cariboni v. Uruguay, comm.no.159/
1983, GAOR, 43rd Session, Supplement No.40(A/43/40), Report of the Human Rights
Committee, p.184; Herera Rubio v. Colombia, comm.no.161/1983, GAOR, 43rd Session,
Supplment No.40(A/43/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.190; Lafuente
Penarrieta et al v. Bolivia, comm.no.176/1984, GAOR, 43rd Session, Supplement No.40(A/
43/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.199; Miango v. Zaire, comm.no. 194/
1985, GAOR, 43rd Session, Supplement No.40(A/43/40), Report of the Human Rights
Committee, p.218; Berterretche Acosta v. Uruguay, comm.no.162/1983, GAOR, 44th
Session, Supplement No.40(A/44/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 183.
17. See P.R. Ghandi, op.cit supra footnote 7, at p.219.
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The case of Santullo v. Uruguay18 appeared to raise the compelling
issue of whether the threat of torture to the victim's wife and children
might not in itself amount to a breach of article 7 in respect of the victim
himself. Unfortunately, this issue was not dealt with by the Committee,
in what may be described as a timid decision to hold that "it cannot find
that there has not been a violation of [article 7]". This rather negative
finding was explicitly spurned by Mr. Walter Tarnopolsky in his
individual opinion which drew the support of five other Committee
members. Whether one can draw the inference that these individual
members would have upheld a finding of torture against the victim
himself in the circumstances outlined would seem doubtful in the context
of a rather perfunctory four line expression of individual opinion, which
makes no express referral to such a possibility.
Allied to this issue of 'transferred' torture is that of mental torture.
Does a prison regime the express purpose of which is to break a
detainee's will mentally amount to "torture" etc. within the meaning of
article7? In Lanza v. Uruguay19 the Committee stated that in respect of,
inter alia, such a plea that there had been violations of article 7 and article
10(1) "because of the treatment which [the victims] received during their
detention". Unfortunately, such wording does not indicate clearly into
which article the particular activity falls - article 7 or article 10(1). This
is unfortunate from the point of view of precision. 20 This rather imprecise
way of expressing its view was persisted in by the Committee in Torres
Ramirez v. Uruguay,2' where the Committee held that the treatment the
author received, which included various forms of torture and ill-
treatment - in particular lack of food and clothing - were a breach of
articles 7 and 10(1). Once again, the wording of the decision does not
make clear whether the particular ill-treatment singled out for mention
was envisaged as within article 7 or in article 10(1); it may be presumed
that they fall within the latter.
A similar criticism could be made of the decision in Weinberger Weisz
v. Uruguay,22 where the Committee held that allegations of torture, food
18. Comm.no. R2/9, GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No.40(A/35/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 107.
19. Comm.no.R2/8, GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No.40(A/35/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 111.
20. See also Soriano de Bouton v. Uruguay, comm.no.129/37, GAOR, 36th Session,
Supplement No.40(A/36/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.14 3.
21. Comm.no.R1/4, GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No.40(A/35/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 121.
22. Comm.no.R7/28, GAOR, 36th Session, Supplement No. 40(A/36/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 11 4.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
rationing, and refusal of visits by family were "severe treatment" falling
within articles 7 and 10(1); it is again presumed that the alligation of food
rationing fell within article 10(1). The allegation of compulsory injection
of hallucinogens was not specifically mentioned in the Committee's
decision. This may seem odd, as the Uruguayan government did not issue
a specific refutation of the allegations - only denials of a general
character - and it could have raised an issue under the second sentence
of article 7, which reads: "[i]n particular, no one shall be subjected
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." In
Viana A costa v. Uruguay2 3 the allegations of psychiatric experimentation
seem not to have been sufficiently substantiated.
At its fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth sessions the Committee gave
final views on a series of cases involving, inter alia, issues under articles
7 and 10(1). These precede the general comments on articles 7 and 10
adopted by the Committee towards the end of the sixteenth session. From
this series of cases a number of observations may be made.
In Pinkney v. Canada24 one of the complaints made by the applicant
was that whilst in prison he had been continually insulted, humiliated,
and physically ill-treated because of his race by prison guards, which he
alleged was, inter alia, a breach of article 10(1). The Committee found
however that "it [did] not have before it any varifiable information to
substantiate [the applicant's] allegations of violations of article 10(2)
.... " This seems to leave the door ajar for a holding that racial
harassment may contravene article 10(1). Sendic v. Uruguay25 suggests
that being held in solitary confinement may, according to the
circumstances be a breach of article 7: here the circumstances included
'planton', limited rest and sleep, beatings, insufficient food and no family
visits.26 This case also indicates that denial of necessary medical attention
will be a breach of article 10(1). In Cubas Simones v. Uruguay27 the
Committee held that where Uruguay had wrongfully denied that the
victim had been detained - this coupled with the fact that the victim had
23. Comm.no. 110/198 1, GAOR, 39th Session, Supplement No.40(A/39/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 169 .
24. Comm.no.R7/27, GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.101; a similar claim of racial harrassment was made in the Bleier
case (see footnote 16) wherein the Committee found there to be (inter alia) a breach of article
10(1).
25. Comm.no.R14/63, GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 114.
26. This interpretation was subsequently upheld in the general comments adopted on article
7 by the Committee at the end of its sixteenth session.
27. Comm.no.R17/70, GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 174.
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been held incommunicado - amounted to a breach of article 10(1). In
amendola Massiotti and Baritussio v. Uruguay28 the Committee indicated
what it thought could amount to "inhuman treatment". It shows that, at
this stage of its jurisprudence, the Committee often preferred to give
examples of what conduct might fall within a particular stipulation rather
than define the term conceptually. Here, the Committee held that there
was "inhuman treatment" where, in one prison, cells were habitually
flooded in the rainy season, where there was gross overcrowding, no
open-courtyard and the prisoners were kept indoors under artificial light
all day without access to fresh air or light, and, in another prison, gross
overcrowding again, insufficient sanitary conditions (one washbasin and
four toilets for one hundred prisoners) and hard labour (making roads,
putting up prison buildings, mixing concrete). Finally, it is interesting to
note that in A.M. v. Denmark 9 the intriguing issue of whether
deportation could in certain circumstances amount to "degrading
treatment or punishment" arose; however, since the Committee made a
decision of inadmissibility under article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol,
this point did not have to be faced.30
(ii) The second period
(a) The general comments themselves
The general comments on articles 7 and 10 (nos. 7 and 9 respectively)
were adopted by the Committee at its 378th meeting (sixteenth session)
held on 27th July 1982.31 The Commitee made the following important
general observations in paragraph I of its comment on article 7. First, the
Committee pointed out that even in times of public emergency under
article 4(1), no derogation from the stipulation of article 7 is permissible
at all under the terms of article 4(2). The mere fact of non-derogability
stresses the fundamental nature of article 7. Secondly, the purpose of the
provision is to protect the integrity and dignity of the human person.
Thirdly, the Committee made clear that it is insufficient for a State to
argue that this article has been effectively implemented in its domestic
law by mere prohibition of the forms of conduct outlawed by the article
28. Comm.no.R6/25, GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 187; for another example of a finding of inhuman treatment see
Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, comm.no. 110/1981, GAOR, 39th session, Supplement No.40(A/
31/40) Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 169.
29. Comm.no.R26/121, GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.212.
30. See P.R. Ghandhi, op.ciL supra footnote 7, at p.229-30.
31. See GAOR, 37th Session, Supplement No.40(A/37/40), Report of the Human Rights
Committee, p.94-5 and 96-7.
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or by rendering them crimes; something more is required: article 7 read
in conjunction with article 2 means that a State must establish some
machinery of control. In particular, complaints about ill-treatment must
be investigated thoroughly by the competent authorities; those found
guilty must be dealt with appropriately and victims must have effective
remedies, including most importantly, the right to obtain compensation.
The Committee suggested a number of safeguards which may make
such control effective: (i) provisions against detainees being held
incommunicado, which grant access to persons such as lawyers, doctors,
and family members without prejudice to the investigation; (ii) provisions
requiring that detainees should be held in publicly recognised places and
that their names should be entered in a central register which is available
to interested parties; (iii) provisions making confessions or other evidence
obtained through torture etc. inadmissible in court; and (iv) training and
instructions to law enforcement officials not to apply to detainees
treatment which violates article 7.
In paragraph 2 of the general comment the Committee dealt with the
interpretation of the specific prohibitions. The Committee made the
obvious point that the terms of the article demand protection far beyond
the notion of torture as normally understood. The Committee felt that it
might not be necessary to draw sharp distinctions between the various
prohibited forms of treatment or punishment, thus presumably envisaging
a 'spectrum' with some overlap application. Clearly, where a "spectrum"
of banned conduct exists within the confines of the same article, it is not,
strictly speaking necessary to define precisely within which part of the
'spectrum' particular conduct falls, since it will be caught somewhere;
however, this is of course at the expense of legal precision. The distinction
between "torture" and "cruel", "inhuman" or "degrading treatment or
punishment" is one of "kind, purpose and severity of the particular
treatment" according to the Committee. Thus, presumably, for example,
if cruel treatment is employed to extract a confession that might remove
the conduct to the plan of torture. Corporal punishment, "including
excessive chastisement as an educational or disciplinary measure" falls
within the scope of the prohibition of article 7, according to the
Committee. By implication, albeit oddly perhaps, "chastisement as an
educational or disciplinary measure" does not appear to fall within the
definition of "corporal punishment" unless it satisfies a further criterion
- that it was "excessive". The interpretation of key terms may be
criticized as being, at the very least, rather vague.
The Committee then went on to endorse what had already emerged
from the pre-existing case-law, that solitary confinement may, according
to all the circumstances, and especially where a detainee has been kept
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incommunicado, amount to a breach of article 7. The scope of the article
includes pupils and patients in educational and mental institutions as well
as detainees. The committee imposed the duty on public authorities to
ensure protection by the law against treatment proscribed by article 7
even when perpetrated by persons acting outside the scope of or without
any official authority. Finally, the Committee stressed what is already
obvious from the pre-existing case-law, namely that there is a close nexus
between articles 7 and 10(1), indeed, they may be seen as
complementary.
In paragraph 3 of the general comment the Committee deals
specifically with the more neglected terms of the second sentence of
article 7, namely, that: "no one shall be subjected without his free consent
to medical or scientific experimentation". The intention of the drafters
was manifestly to outlaw the hideous scientific experimentation of the
Nazi concentration camps. The Committee stressed that "special
protection in regard to such experiments is necessary in the case of
persons not capable of giving their consent", for example, minors, mental
patients etc., but did not in any way seek to elaborate upon what such
special protection might consist of.
Article 10(1) reads: "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person". One might be foregiven for suggesting that the legal
value of such a provision was certainly open to question. However, it is
a measure of the Committee's creative development of the provision that
it now stands solidly as an additional bulwark to and closely allied with
the provisions of article 7. In paragraph 2 of its general comment on this
article the Committee emphasised this factor, describing it as
"supplement[ing] article 7 as regards to treatment of all32 persons
deprived of their liberty". The Committee stated categorically that since
this provision was a "basic standard of universal application" it could not
"depend entirely on material resources". This underpins the fundamental
nature of article 10(1) and once again illustrates its close relationship with
article 7. As with article 7, 10(1) is not confined to prisoners, but extends
also to detainees and those held in hopsitals and correctional institutions.
(b) The subsequent jurisprudence
A considerable number of cases worthy of note on articles 7 and 10(1)
have arisen since the general comments on them in communications in
which the Committee has given its final views.
32. Emphasis added.
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Campora Schweizer v. Uruguay33 raises two points to observe. First,
the essence of one of the allegations was that at one particular detention
centre the entire r6gime was geared to "totally destroying the individual
personality" of all the prisoners - in effect, an allegation of
psychological torture; this aspect was not considered of itself by the
Committee. Secondly, it is hard to reconcile this case with the Massera
case. As we have seen, in that case the Committee decided that detention
"under conditions seriously detrimental to ... health" would contravene
both article 10(1) and 7. In the instant case, the detention certainly
seemed to have this quality: constant harassment and persecution by
guards, a r6gime of arbitrary prohibitions, stark contrast between
solitude-isolation and being closely watched (inter alia via peepholes and
microphones), solitary confinement for ninety days at a time,
malnutrition leading to breakdown of physical and mental health, lack of
fresh air and facilities for exercise, coupled with psychological pressure.
Yet the committee elected to find a breach of article 10(1) only by virtue
of the fact that the victim had been detained under "inhuman prison
conditions". If, as seems likely, the Committee was trying to draw a
distinction between mistreatment (on which there was insufficient specific
evidence after 23 March 1976) and conditions of imprisonment, this is yet
another source of discrepancy since these concepts seem inextricably
interwoven in the Massera decision.
This decision seems even more extraordinary when compared with
Marais v. Madagascar,34 where the Committee held that there had been
a breach of articles 7 an 10(1) because of "the human conditions" in
which the victim had been held, in essence, solitary confinement in a
basement cell for over three years; it may be that the Committee put
much more weight relatively on the fact of solitary confinement rather
than the surrounding physical circumstances as prevailed in the Campora
Schweizer case. However, such a suggestion can only be made with some
diffidence since in Wight v. Madagascar,35 it was an amalgam of solitary
confinement and surrounding physical conditions that elicited a finding
of a breach of articles 7 and 10(1) on the basis of inhuman conditions of
detention, just as in the Marais case and in Martinez Portorreal v. The
Dominican Republic,36 a similar finding of breaches of articles 7 and
33. Comm.no.66/1980, GAOR, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/38/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 1 17.
34. Comm.no.66/1980, GAOR, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/38/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 117.
35. Comm.no. 115/1982, GAOR, 40th Session, Supplement No.40(A/40/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 171.
36. Comm.no.188/1984, GAOR, 43rd Session, Supplement No.40(A/43/40) Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.2 0 7 .
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10(1) was made on the basis of inhuman conditions of detention
evidenced only by the surrounding circumstances.
What is clear from these cases and others, for example, Angel Estrella
v. Uruguay,37 is that inhuman prison conditions will certainly justify a
finding of a breach of articles 10(1). The Angel Estrella case also seems
to involve the assumption that psychological torture, at least when
accomplished by severe physical mistreatment, will amount to a breach
of article 7, since this aspect was involved in the treatment complained of
which the Committee found to be a violation of that article, thus
apparently solving the interpretational difficulty raised in the Lanza case
discussed already.
Vasilskis v. UruguayM represents a step forward in the article 7
jurisprudence of the Committee. Instead of feeling obliged to justify a
finding of a breach of articles 7 and 10(1) by reference to specific acts of
misconduct, the Committee simply invoked the general purpose behind
article 7, as explained by the Committee in its general comment, which
is, in effect, spelt out in article 10(1), to find that both the provisions just
referred to had been breached because the victim had not been treated in
prison "with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person".
This case was followed in Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay39 and in Luyeye
v. Zaireo - but in respect of a holding of a breach of article 10(1) only
- and only on terms that the victim had not been treated with
"humanity". It is uncertain to what extent, if at all, the truncated finding
in Luyeye differs from the fuller finding made, for example, in the
Vaselskis case (discussed above) or Almirati Nieto v. Uruguay,4' where
the full finding that article 10(1) had been breached because the victim
had not been treated in prison with "humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person" was made.42 This latter decision
37. Comm.no.74/1980, GAOR, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/43/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 150; see also Cariboni v. Uruguay, comm.no. 159/1183, GAOR,
43rd Session, Supplement No.40(A/43/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 184.
38. Comm.no.80/1980, GAOR, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/38/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 173.
39. Comm.88/1981, idemn, p.180 .
40. Comm.no.90/1981, iden, p.197.
41. Comm.no.92/1981, idem., p.201; see also Romero v. Uruguay, comm.no.85/1981,
GAOR, 39th Session, Supplement No.40(A/39/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee,
p.159; Berterretche Acosta v. Uruguay, comm.no.162/1983, GAOR, 44th Session
Supplement No. 40(A/44/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 183.
42. See also Lluberas v. Uruguay, comm.no.123/1982, GAOR, 39th Session, Supplement
No. 40(A/39/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 175 for an identical finding. It
is equally uncertain whether those findings differ in any way from a finding that article 10(1)
was breached because the conditions of detention (including solitary confinement for several
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seems also to display no obvious reason why a breach of article 7 was not
also found by the Committee since its stated in paragraph 10.4 of its
views that Uruguay had "refuted only in general terms the author's
detailed allegations that her father is held under inhuman prison
conditions at Libertad [prison] .... The submissions of the State party in
this respect are an insufficient answer to the allegations made. The
Committee recalls its findings in other cases that a practice of inhuman
treatment existed at Libertad prison during the period to which the
present communication relates . . ." Exactly the same criticism may be
made of the decision in Estradet Cabreira v. Uruguay.
43
The case of Quinteros v. Uruguay" was a significant advance in the
jurisprudence of the Committee on the rights of relatives of victims. The
author alleged that her daughter Elena was abducted by Uruguay
military personnel from the sanctuary of the Venezuelan embassy in
Montevideo to which she had escaped following her arrest because of her
political opinions. The author claimed that since that day (28 June 1976)
she had no official information as to the whereabouts of her daughter and
nor was her detention officially admitted. In so far as the claim related to
herself, the author alleged that, inter alia, she herself was a victim of a
violation of article 7 because of the psychological torture she endured in
not knowing where her daughter was. The Committee in its decision
stated boldly that it understood: "the anguish and stress caused to the
mother by the disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing
uncertainty concerning her fate and whereabouts. The author has the
right to know what happened to her daughter. In these respects, she too
is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered by her daughter in
particular, of article 7." Here there is a categoric finding of psychological
torture inflicted upon a person (close relative) who is not also the
recipient of acts of physical mistreatment. This development of the terms
of the Covenant is to be warmly applauded and is undoubtedly a high
point in the jurisprudence of the Committee.
months) failed to "respect the inherent dignity of the human person" - see Gomez de Voituret
v. Uruguay, comm.no. 109/1981, GAOR, 39th Session, Supplement No.40(A/39/40), Report
of the Human Rights Committee, p. 168.
43. Comm.no.105/1981, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/38/40), Report of the Human
Rights Committee, p.209; see also Romero v. Uruguay, comm.no.85/1981, GAOR, 39th
Session, Supplement No.40(A/39/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.1 59 ;
Berterretche Acosta v. Uruguay, comm.no.162/1983, GAOR, 44th Session, Supplement
No.40(A/44/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p. 183.
44. Comm.no.107/1981, GAOR, 38th Session, Supplement No.40(A/38/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.216; see also C. Jones, Human Rights: Rights of Relatives of
Victims - Views of the Human Rights Committee in the Quinteros Communication (1984),
25 Harvard International L.J., 470.
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The case of Conteris v. Uruguay45 is interesting for several reasons.
First, it shows that when the Committee speaks of "extreme ill-
treatment" or "severe ill-treatment" (apparently used indifferently in this
case) the Committee is in fact referring to torture, in this case, hanging by
the wrists for ten days, subjection to burnings and repeated 'submarino'
- immersing of the head of the victim in water fouled by blood, urine
and vomit almost to the point of drowning. Secondly, the case illustrates
that in the terminology of the Committee harsh treatment falls a degree
below degrading treatment. Thirdly, degrading conditions of detention
(presumably no different from degrading treatment) may be evidenced by
repeated solitary confinement - this is in harmony with the general
comment - and transferral from one part of the prison to another to
induce disorientation. Simple "ill-treatment" will, it seems qualify only
for a finding of a breach of article 10(1) according to the decision in
Mpandanjila et al v. Zaire46 and Solorzano v. Uruguay.47
In Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica,48 several important questions had to
be considered by the Committee. The case concerned the imposition of
the death penalty for murder on both applicants. The facts and allegations
were particularly complicated but, in essence, insofar as they concern
article 7 the allegations were these: (i) the delays in the judicial
proceedings against them constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment in violation of article 7: by the time a petition for special leave
to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was dismissed
on 17 July 1986 some nine years had elapsed since the alleged offence
and seven years since conviction; and, (ii) the fact that they had been
confined to death-row since their conviction and sentence in January
1979 ('death-row phenomenon') constituted cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment prohibited by article 7. It must also be mentioned
that on 13 February 1987 a warrant was issued for the execution of both
men to take place on 24 February 1987. A stay of execution was granted
to both men on 23 February 1987 but they were notified of the stay only
45 minutes before the executions were to take place on 24 February. (In
fact, there was later a second warrant for execution and a second stay in
February and March 1988).
45. Comm.no. 139/1983, GAOR, 40th Session, Supplement No.40(A/40/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.196.
46. Comm.no.138/1983, GAOR, 41st Session, Supplement No.41(A/41/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.12 1 .
47. Comm.no.156/1983, GAOR, 41st Session, Supplement No.41(A/41/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.1 3 4 .
48. Comm.nos.210/1986 and 225/1987, GAOR, 44th Session, Supplement No.40(A/44/
40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.222.
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In rejecting the first limb of the applicants' arguments under article 7,
the Committee declared that: "[i]n principle, prolonged judicial
proceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for the convicted
prisoners. However, the situation could be otherwise in cases involving
capital punishment and an assessment of the circumstances of each case
would be necessary. In the present cases the Committee does not find that
the authors have sufficiently substantiated their claim that delay in
judicial proceedings constituted for them49 cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment under article 7." The Committee does not say what evidence
will suffice; but since the test would seem to be subjective, presumably
any medical or psychiatric evidence would be sufficient.
The Committee did not deal with the "death-row phenomenon'
argument either in isolation or in relation to the first argument. Surely it
is possible to argue that the death-row phenomenon in itself is self-
evidently a circumstance bringing the delay within the ambit of article 7?
Instead, the Committee opted to deal with the narrow issue of warrants
for execution and the notification of the stay of execution under article 7.
It said: "[i]t is uncontested that the decision to grant a first stay of
execution, taken at noon on 23 February 1987, was not notified to the
authors until 45 minutes before the scheduled time of the execution on 24
February 1987. The Committee considers that a delay of close to 20
hours from the time the stay of execution was granted to the time the
authors were removed from their death cell constitutes cruel and
inhuman treatment within the meaning of article 7."
Vuolanne v. Finland0 probably represents the Committee's most
detailed analysis of article 7 and, incidentally by a State Party, outside the
terms of the general comment on the article in question. In this case, the
applicant went A.WO.L. during compulsory military service. As a
disciplinary measure, he was punished with ten days of close arrest-
confinement in the guardhouse without service duties. He alleged
breaches of various articles including article 7. In relation to this article
he complained that: (i) he was confined in a cell of 2 x 3 metres with a
tiny window, furnished only with a camp bed, a small table, a chair, and
a dim electric light; (ii) he was only allowed out of his cell for purposes
of eating, going to the toilet and to have fresh air for half an hour a day;
49. Emphasis added.
50. Comm.no.265/1987, GAOR, 44th Session, Supplement No.40(A/44/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.249; see also the note from the Finnish government responding
to the Committee's decision of a violation of article 9 paragraph 4 with a declaration of
legislative preparations in idem, p.311.
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(iii) he was prohibited from talking to other detained persons and from
making any noise in his cell; and, (iv) that his isolation was almost total.
As a supplementary argument, the author pleaded that if these facts were
insufficient to form the basis of a holding under article 7, then they must
fall within the terms of article 10(1). In a detailed pronouncement, that
went beyond the terms of the general comment, the Committee recalled
that:
article 7 prohibits torture and cruel or other inhuman or degrading
treatment. It observes that the assessment of what constitutes inhuman or
degrading treatment falling within the meaning of article 7 depends on all
the circumstances of the case, such as the duration and manner of the
treatment, its physical or mental effects as well as the sex, age and state of
health of the victim. A thorough examination of the present communica-
tion has not disclosed any facts in support of the author's allegations that
he is a victim of a violation of his rights set forth in article 7. In no case
was severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, inflicted upon
Antti Vuolanne by or at the instigation of a public official; nor does it
appear that the solitary confinement to which the author was subjected,
having regard to its strictness, duration an the end pursued, produced any
adverse physical or mental effects on him. Furthermore, it has not been
established that Mr. Vuolanne suffered any humiliation or that his dignity
was interfered with apart from the embarrassment inherent in the
disciplinary measure to which he was subjected. In this connection, the
Committee expresses the view that for punishment to be degrading, the
humiliation or debasement involved must exceed a particular level and
must, in any event, entail other elements beyond the mere fact of
deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, the Committee finds that the facts
before it do not substantiate the allegation that during his detention Mr.
Vuolanne was treated without humanity or without respect for the
inherent dignity of the person, as required under article 10, paragraph 1,
of the Covenant."
In particular, the Committee has both clarified and emphasized the
highly substantive nature of the analysis by specifically singling out
factors such as sex, age, and state of health of the victim as determinants
of whether they constitute treatment prohibited by article 7. The
infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
elucidated as a criterion for the application of article 7, a rather vague
term which will certainly need to be further refined. Further, the
Committee has articulated the view that for treatment to be degrading the
humiliation or debasement involved "must exceed a particular level". It
is not made clear whether this is subjective or objective; is it debasement
in the victim's own eyes or in that of others? It is suggested that the
subjective view must be correct as being more in harmony with the
general tone of the analysis. However, the Committee does state that
mere deprivation of liberty will not justify a finding of "degrading
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treatment"; it states that "other elements" are entailed without giving any
examples.
IV. Inadmissibility Decisions
The Committee's decisions on inadmissibility have also produced some
novel points. ME v. The Netherlands5 raised the interesting question as
to whether, and if at all, in what circumstances, the compulsory expulsion
of an alien might constitute "cruel and inhuman treatment" in violation
of article 7. Unfortunately, the substantive issue did not have to be
considered as the Committee found the communication to be
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. Another interesting
question, which was raised by the Committee itself, and which did not
require determination owning to a decision of inadmissibility, arose in
JM v. Jamaica,52 namely, whether a denial of a passport in the
surrounding circumstances, including various detentions and deporta-
tions, might be degrading treatment within the meaning of article 7.
Similarly, in S.H.B v. Canada3 the extraordinary allegation that the
Matrimonial Property Act of the Province of Alberta which gave judges
"absolute and unchallengeable discretionary powers" exposed the
petitioner to "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" by subjecting
him "to the whims of the judge, and his prejudices" was levelled. The
communication was declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies under article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol; it is
not thought that such a plea would have much chance of success on the
merits.
In L.C. et aL v. Jamaica54 the technical point arose as to whether a
delay of six years occasioned by the Jamaican Court of Appeal's failure
to produce a written judgment thereby rendering impossible an
application for leave to appeal to the Board of the Privy Council in the
meanwhile, in a case involving capital punishment (execution), could in
itself amount to "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" within article
7. However, this issue did not have to be dealt with since this
communication was also declared inadmissible under article 5, paragraph
2(b), of the Optional Protocol.
51. Comm.no.173/1984, GAOR, 40th Session, Supplement No.40(A/40/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.213.
52. Comm. No. 165/1984, GAOR, 41st Session, Supplement No.40(A/41/40), Report of
the Human Rigths Committee, p. 164.
53. Comm.no.192/1985, GAOR, 42nd Session, Supplement No.40(A/42/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p. 174.
54. LC. et aL v. Jamaica, comm.no.257/1987, GAOR, 43rd Session, Supplement No.40(A/
43/40), Report of the Human Rights Committee, p.267.
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There are other decisions on inadmissibility in which interesting points
on articles 7 and 10(1) might have arisen but for that decision. In
H.C.MA. v. The Netherlands5 5 the allegation was that a breach of the
terms of article 7 had been perpetrated by a Royal Military Police officer
who, when arresting the applicant during the break-up of a demonstra-
tion, had injured his jaw when he did not submit himself willingly to
arrest. In JH. v. Finland56 the claim, which was not specifically pleaded,
appeared to be that a sentence of 6V years and fine of 378,000 Finnish
markkaa for having smuggled and sold in Finland 15 kilos of hashish,
was a breach, inter alia, of article 7 of the Covenant. In an adjunct case
arising out of the same incident, R.M v. Finland,57 the allegation, again
not apparently expressed explicitly, was that the absence of a lawyer and
of a tape-recorder at the stage of preliminary investigation, which made
it impossible to prove the conditions of ill-treatment to which he was
allegedly subjected, was in itself a breach of article 7.
V. Conclusion
Although, of course, the Committee is not in any sense a court of law
("its views" are not strictly speaking binding and it lacks enforcement
powers) it is well aware that for its authority to continue to be respected
both by States Parties and petitioners alike, it must be seen to be acting
competently and in a manner which, as nearly as possible, emulates the
way in which a court of law acts. Its decisions must conform to a judicial
pattern and its rationes decidendi be clearly revealed. Above all, a certain
consistency in its jurisprudence is essential. The Committee's impartiality
and objectivity are beyond doubt but the examination of the case-law on
articles 7 and 10(1) concluded above reveals a worrying lack of
consistency in certain respects and, to a degree, a lack of internal logical
coherence. Occasionally, there are traces of timidity, which stand in
marked contrast to more radical decisions such as Quinteros58 or
searching ones such as in Vuolanne.5 9 Of course, from time to time the
Committee may have no alternative but to withhold its opinion on
difficult, interesting or sensitive issues because of a finding of
inadmissibility; one wonders, however, whether it might not be possible
55. Comm.no.213/1186, GAOR, 44th Session, Supplement No.40(A/44/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.267.
56. Comm.no.300/1988, GAOR, 44th Session, Supplement no.40(A/44/40), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, p.29 8 .
57. Comm.no.301/1988, idenm, p.300.
58. See footnote 44.
59. See footnote 50.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
in some instances at least to hand down a few comments in these cases
by way of obiter dicta.
Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the Committee is faced with
tremendous difficulties in the development of its case-law, not least
having to interpret a provision in a way which is in harmony with the
multitude of a legal and political systems represented within the States
Parties. Another feature needs to be borne in mind: the jurisprudential
development of articles 7 and 10(1) by the Committee has been heavily
influenced by the high proportion of communications involving these
provisions brought against Uruguay, other Latin American States, and
one or two African States. In one sense, this provides a good test of the
Committee's success or failure since these countries were (at least at the
time of submission of the individual communications) among the worst
violators of fundamental human rights.
Unfortunately, there is very little direct evidence that the worst
violators are heavily influenced by the views of the Committee when it
has ordered release and-or payment of compensation in the cases
discussed above. However, there are some positive indicators. In two
notes dated 31 May and 10 July 1984 respectively, addressed to the
Secretary-General of the U.N., the Uruguayan Government revealed the
names of all those released from prison, including several whose cases
had been brought before the Committee for consideration and concluded
by its final views. The Committee also heard of the release of Dave
Marais by the Malagasy authorities. Furthermore, the Committee has
learned of the release by Uruguay of other petitioners from independent
sources. Finally, it should be mentioned that at its twenty-fourth session
(25 March to 12 April, 1985) the Committee received a message from
the new Uruguayan Government's Minister for Foreign Affairs thanking
it for its close attention to communications from Uruguay and promising
to undertake full compliance with the terms of the Covenant in the
future. The Committee's decisions under articles 7 and 10(1) must
accordingly be rated as a qualified success since they have impacted
positively on concrete human rights situations.60
60. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous support of the Nuffield Foundation in this
research.
